Whether colleges increase tuition in response to increased federal student loan limits (the Bennett Hypothesis) has been a topic of debate in the higher education community for decades, yet most studies have been based on small increases to Pell Grant or undergraduate student loan limits. In this paper, I leverage a large increase in Grad PLUS loan limits that took place in 2006 to examine whether law schools responded by raising tuition or other living expenses and whether student debt levels also increased. Using data from 2001 to 2015 across public and private law schools and both interrupted time series and difference-in-differences analytical techniques, I found rather modest relationships across both public and private law schools. I conclude with some possible explanations for the lack of strong empirical support for the Bennett Hypothesis.
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A great deal of attention has been paid to the rapidly rising price of an undergraduate education. Between the 1996-97 and 2016-17 academic years, the inflation-adjusted listed price of tuition and fees increased by 112% at public four-year colleges and by 68% at private nonprofit colleges ). Yet although tuition prices for professional programs such as law, medicine, and business have risen at similar rates (Baum & Steele, 2017) and graduate enrollments have risen faster than undergraduate enrollments since 2000 (McFarland, Hussar, de Brey, Snyder, Wang, Wilkinson-Flicker et al., 2017) , postbaccalaureate prices have received relatively little attention. For example, law students now face sticker tuition and fee prices of nearly $80,000 at public schools and $135,000 at private schools over the course of three years (American Bar Association, 2015; author's calculations using American Bar Association data).
While other graduate programs have seen large increases in sticker prices over the last two decades, PhD students see the majority of their charges covered by grants and scholarships.
Law and medical students get about 20% of charges covered by scholarships-or one-third of what PhD students receive (Baum & Steele, 2017) . This has resulted in student debt rapidly increasing among professional students, with law students seeing the largest increase. In 2012, 87% of law students with debt graduated with a median debt of $140,616, up from $88,634 in inflation-adjusted dollars in 2004 (Delisle, 2014) . Students in medical fields borrowed more (an average of $161,772), but median wages for lawyers are half of that for primary care physicians ($118,160 versus $251,578) (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017) . With starting salaries of new lawyers now below $70,000 (Kowarski, 2017) , law students face debt-to-earnings ratios well above students in other graduate and professional fields. This makes law school pricing and debt of particular interest to researchers and policymakers alike.
One factor that some people believe contributes to increases in both tuition prices and student debt burdens is the availability of federal financial aid that students can access to finance their education. The idea that colleges take advantage of increased loan eligibility is widely attributed to William Bennett, who was President Reagan's Secretary of Education. In a 1987 opinion piece in The New York Times entitled "Our Greedy Colleges," he wrote: "Increases in financial aid in recent years have enabled colleges and universities blithely to raise their tuitions, confident that Federal loan subsidies would help cushion the increase" (Bennett, 1987) . This theory, which became known as the Bennett Hypothesis, has been hotly debated for decades and has been the subject of a number of empirical studies. However, all of this research was for the undergraduate student population and mainly focused on the relationship between federal grant aid and tuition prices (e.g., Archibald & Feldman, 2016; Heller, 2013; Stoll, Bradley, & Mahan, 2014 ). Yet although post-baccalaureate students hold nearly about 40% of all outstanding student debt (Delisle, 2014) , there has been no empirical research examining whether the Bennett Hypothesis holds for graduate or professional programs.
I conduct the first empirical examination of the Bennett Hypothesis in professional education in this paper by leveraging two policy changes that increased the availability and attractiveness of federal student loans to law school students. Prior to 2006, law students (along with most other professional students) could borrow $18,500 per year in federal loans. This amount is well below typical tuition and fees at private colleges and slightly more than tuition and fees at public colleges, meaning that private loans or self-financing were needed to cover the National Center for Education Statistics, 2017) .
Graduate students make up only 15% of all students attending colleges that are eligible to receive federal financial aid, but they are responsible for about 38% of all federal loan dollars (author's calculation using data from Baum et al. (2016) and National Center for Education Statistics (2017)).
Graduate and professional school students were first able to access federal loans through the 1958 National Defense Education Act, which became the modern Perkins Loan program (Kelchen, 2014) . Graduate students can still qualify to receive up to $8,000 per year or $60,000 in their lifetime in this need-based program, which provides about $200 million per year in funding to students who attend participating colleges (New America, 2015) . Access to federal From the 1993-94 through the 2006-07 academic years, most graduate and professional students could borrow up to $8,500 per year in subsidized loans (in which interest is not charged until six months after the student leaves school) and up to $18,500 in subsidized and unsubsidized loans (in which interest accrues immediately) in a given year. Students were subject to a lifetime borrowing limit of $65,500 in subsidized loans and $138,500 in subsidized and unsubsidized loans (FinAid.org, 2017) , with students in certain health-related fields having higher limits (Federal Student Aid, 2008) . In July 2007, the annual borrowing limit increased to $20,500 through a $2,000 increase in unsubsidized loan limits, while the annual limit for subsidized loans and the lifetime borrowing limit remained unchanged. The Budget Control Act of 2011 eliminated all subsidized loans for graduate and professional students as of July 2012, but the $20,500 annual and $138,500 lifetime borrowing limits for any federal loans outside the Grad PLUS program remained.
Rising tuition prices and stagnant federal borrowing limits meant that more students had to turn to private loans or savings in order to pay for graduate or professional education. Law students were more likely than all other types of graduate or professional students to take out private loans in the 1990s and 2000s, with the percentage of law students with private loans rising from 13% in 1995 -96 to 28% in 1999 -2000 and 36% in 2003 -04 (Woo & Shaw, 2015 .
The availability and terms of private educational loans are based in part on a student's creditworthiness, which is not a factor for subsidized and unsubsidized federal loans and could affect whether students are able to access credit for attending college.
The creation of the Grad PLUS program in 2006 addressed this potential gap in financing graduate and professional education by allowing students to borrow up to the full cost of attendance without any other lifetime borrowing limits. Grad PLUS loans are different from other federal loans in that a student must not have an 'adverse credit history'-or provide a cosigner if the borrower has adverse credit (Federal Student Aid, 2015) . But this standard is easier for borrowers to meet than the requirements to receive a private loan at competitive interest rates, making credit available to more students. Law students quickly turned away from private loans as an option, with 20% of students holding private loans in 2007-08 and just 5% in 2011-12. By 2011-12, 59% of law students took out PLUS loans and graduates averaged nearly $55,000 in Grad PLUS debt. As a comparison, just five percent of MBA students, three percent of PhD students, and 34% of medical students took out Grad PLUS loans in 2011-12(author's calculations using data from the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study; Woo & Shaw, 2015) .
The other major change to graduate and professional student lending occurred with the expansion of income-driven student loan repayment options. A small Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR) plan was created in the 1992 Higher Education Act reauthorization, but it was only available to students at a select number of colleges and the terms (up to 20% of discretionary income-above 150% of the federal poverty line-for up to 25 years) were not appealing to most students. In 2007, the College Cost Reduction and Access Act created an Income-Based Repayment (IBR) program that allowed all federal loan borrowers to access an income-driven program that forgave any remaining debt after 25 years of paying 15% of the borrower's discretionary income. In the initial legislation, subsidized and unsubsidized graduate loans were eligible for IBR while Grad PLUS loans were not. However, Grad PLUS loans were included in the final rules that implemented IBR in 2008 in what was likely a drafting error (Shireman, 2017) . Allowing grad students to access IBR likely contributed to the decline in private borrowing, as interest rates for private loans were often competitive with Grad PLUS but private loans did not offer income-driven repayment plans (Bhole, 2017) .
Income-driven repayment options were further expanded in the early 2010s with the creation of three new plans (an updated IBR plan, Pay As You Earn, and Revised Pay As You Earn). These options can allow graduate and professional students to pay 10% of their discretionary income for as little as 20 years (Federal Student Aid, n.d.) . All of these plans do tax any remaining balances that are forgiven, although these programs are too new for anyone to have actually faced a tax bill for forgiveness and there have been multiple bills introduced over the last several years to eliminate these taxes (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2016). forgiven without facing any tax burden on the forgiven balance. Law schools helped lead the push for PSLF in an effort to encourage students to choose public-interest law fields, especially as many law school graduates have high debt-to-income ratios under extended payment plans (Chapman & Lounkaew, 2015; Schrag, 2007) .
Some analysts have suggested that the presence of income-driven plans and PSLF may make the traditional law school model economically viable for a higher percentage of students (e.g., Crespi, 2014) . Although the Department of Education does not make specific data on law or graduate students' usage of IBR and PSLF available, overall trends suggest that law students are likely using these programs at high rates. More than 650,000 borrowers across all fields have completed employment certification forms for PSLF with the Department of Education as of June 2017, which is an indicator of potential forgiveness in the future as the first students begin to be eligible for forgiveness in late 2017 (Federal Student Aid, 2017) . Additionally, the average loan balance in income-driven plans was nearly $53,000 as of late 2016, which is far higher than the typical loan balance for students who did not attend graduate school (Federal Student Aid, 2017) . The U.S. Government Accountability Office (2016) recently estimated that the Department of Education was significantly underestimating taxpayer costs under income-driven plans, in part due to the higher rates of high-debt students using these plans.
Theoretical grounding and literature review
The theoretical grounding for this study lies in resource dependency theory (e.g., Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976) , in which the vast majority of colleges are dependent on those outside the institution (such as prospective students, governmental bodies, and donors) to provide resources.
Diversifying revenue sources has traditionally been important for tuition-reliant private colleges, but is becomingly increasingly crucial for public colleges as state appropriations keep up with inflation but not with enrollment growth (Carlson, 2016) . Professional programs provide an opportunity for colleges to diversify their revenue sources beyond undergraduate tuition dollars.
A growing number of universities are adopting variations of responsibility center management budgeting models for their professional programs, which require individual colleges or programs to generate their own revenue (Kosten, 2016; Strauss & Curry, 2002) . In these models, a percentage of a program's revenue goes to the university's central administration to pay for overhead. Law schools frequently turn over 25% to 30% of their revenue to the administration, which brings complaints from law school deans that they are subsidizing other departments on campus (Segal, 2011) . As any remaining proceeds stay within the department, both the department and the university have an incentive to raise additional revenue through tuition.
Professional programs also have an incentive to raise tuition in an effort to become (or appear) more prestigious. Bowen's (1980) revenue theory of costs stated that reputation is associated with a high price tag, and as such colleges will seek to raise and spend as much money as possible. This is augmented by the push from private-sector rankings providers such as U.S. News & World Report to directly reward programs that have high per-student expenditures--with the justification that additional resources will result in a higher-quality educational environment (Morse, 2016) . There is also some evidence of the "Chivas Regal" effect, in which colleges that slipped in the rankings raised their tuition in an effort to appear more prestigious (Askin & Bothner, 2016) .
Colleges often counter mentions of Bowen's revenue theory of costs with Baumol's (1967) cost disease hypothesis, in which the heavy reliance on highly-skilled labor explains cost increases. Over the long term, it appears that Baumol's cost disease is responsible for most of the rise in educational costs (Archibald & Feldman, 2008) . However, there is some evidence in recent years that research universities' actions regarding staffing patterns that would broadly fall under Bowen's theory contribute to rising costs more than Baumol's cost disease (Martin & Hill, 2013; . Lau (2014) found that for-profit colleges increased tuition prices by $.51 for each onedollar increase in loan limits, compared to $.25 among community colleges. Lucca, Nadauld, and Shen (2015) estimated that increases in subsidized loans were more strongly associated with tuition increases ($.45 to $.60 for each dollar in loans) than unsubsidized loans (between zero and $.17). They found stronger evidence of the Bennett Hypothesis at for-profit and expensive private nonprofit colleges than other sectors of higher education. This fits with Gillen's (2012) Bennett Hypothesis 2.0, which opined that selective colleges may respond to the availability of additional federal financial aid by raising their tuition more than less-selective institutions.
There has been more research examining whether increases in Pell Grant awards for undergraduate students is associated with higher listed tuition prices. These findings generally support mixed (Rizzo & Ehrenberg, 2004; Singell & Stone, 2007) or modest positive relationships (Lau, 2014; Lucca et al., 2015; Turner, 2014) . Cellini and Goldin (2014) took a different empirical strategy, comparing the prices of for-profit colleges that received federal financial aid to those that did not and finding some support for the Bennett Hypothesis.
There are two main differences between undergraduate and graduate programs that could affect the relationship between federal student aid and tuition prices. The first difference is that changes to federal student loan limits and maximum Pell Grants for undergraduate students have been quite modest over time. Undergraduate loan limits increased by between $2,000 and $3,000 per year (with a lifetime increase of $8,000 for dependent students and $11,500 for independent students) between the 2006-07 and 2008-09 academic years-the first increases since 1993 (Wei & Skomsvold, 2012) . The maximum Pell Grant increased by $1,500 between the 2006-07 and 2011-12 academic years, but changed little over the preceding and following five-year periods (author's calculations using Federal Student Aid data). The implementation of Grad PLUS, on the other hand, could allow law students to take out more than $40,000 per year in additional federal loans based on their cost of attendance.
The second key difference between undergraduate and graduate programs is that the higher loan limits for graduate students make at least partial student loan forgiveness far more likely for graduate students, meaning that the sticker price is less salient for some students. This is particularly true among borrowers who plan to pursue Public Service Loan Forgiveness due to the relatively low earnings of individuals working for government or nonprofit agencies. Delisle and Holt (2014) examined law students' debt and income patterns and showed that a law school graduate with the median income of $59,000 per year would not have their monthly payments under PSLF increase once their debt exceeded $55,000 per year. Meanwhile, a 75 th percentile earner of $95,000 per year would reach the 'zero marginal cost' threshold at $117,000 in debtstill below the median debt in the sample of $140,000. Georgetown University's law school famously set up a Loan Repayment Assistance Program that increased the sticker price of tuition in order to cover students' loan payments under PSLF, resulting in a program in which taxpayers covered the entire price tag of a law degree (Matthews, 2013) .
Data, Methods, and Sample
To examine whether law schools' tuition prices, living allowances, or student debt burdens of graduates was affected by changes to federal student loan policies, I constructed a sixteen-year panel dataset from a number of sources. Details on the specific data sources, analytic methods, and institutions included in the analyses are provided below.
Data
My primary data source for these analyses is U.S. News & World Report's annual guidebooks containing rankings of graduate and professional programs. Each year, the magazine gathers information from participating institutions across a range of disciplines such as education, business, engineering, medicine, and law to both develop its program-level rankings and to help prospective students choose which program to attend. This is the most comprehensive source of program-level information on law schools over time, as the U.S. 30 to reflect a full-time course load that would allow students to graduate in three years. I was unable to examine tuition prices after institutional grant aid due to a high rate of missing data on this measure.
Department of Education generally does not publish (or in many cases
The second outcome of interest is the living allowance portion of the total cost of attendance, which is designed to cover room, board, and other non-tuition living expenses.
Although colleges do not directly receive these funds, it is possible that law programs may have raised their living allowances in an effort to either recruit students or to better meet their needs.
The final measure is the mean student loan debt graduates incurred to attend law school, which covers about 90% of all law students who take on debt to finance their education.
The U.S. News guides also contained a number of other data elements that can be used as covariates in the regressions to help control for other factors that could be affecting law school pricing or debt levels. This is important due to large changes to the landscape of legal education following the Great Recession. I also used IPEDS data on three other variables that could affect graduate tuition pricing-the percentage of enrollment that is graduate and professional students, tuition revenue as a percentage of overall revenue, and per-student endowment revenue-to reflect the reliance on graduate enrollment and the institution's overall financial health. For the small percentage of institutions that reported combined financial data with other institutions in their system due to sharing the same Federal Student Aid OPEID (Jaquette & Parra, 2014) , I assigned the same per-FTE values to all colleges that share the same OPEID. I also ran models excluding the 13 freestanding private nonprofit law schools (which are almost entirely reliant on law school tuition dollars to fund operations), but this did not affect the overall results.
In an additional set of analyses, I examined tuition, living allowance, and student debt changes over time for undergraduate students as well as law students. Data on in-state and outof-state tuition prices and living allowances for undergraduate students came from IPEDS, while median student debt burdens of bachelor's degree recipients came from the College Scorecard.
Additional control variables from IPEDS for undergraduates included the percentage of female and racial/ethnic minority students; I did not use admissions criteria due to a high percentage of missing data and the difficulty trying to equate LSAT and ACT/SAT scores. 
Methods
To examine my research questions, I used two different analytic models (each of which was done separately for public and private nonprofit institutions) to examine the extent to which the Bennett Hypothesis holds for law schools. My primary analysis is based on an interrupted time series model that tests for whether there is a change in the trends for each of the outcomes after the Grad PLUS program was implemented in 2006 and students could borrow up to the full cost of attendance. The regression equation is the following for college i: As an additional analysis, I used a difference-in-differences strategy that tested for whether there was a change in tuition prices, living allowances, or debt burdens for law students following the implementation of Grad PLUS loans relative to undergraduate students at four-year colleges that did not have law schools. The regression equation is the following for college i:
where Law is a dummy variable for law schools (versus undergraduate programs) and YrsPost is the number of years since July 1, 2006. The key variable of interest is Law*YrsPost, which represents the differential slope for each year following 2006 between law schools and undergraduate institutions; a positive value would reflect a sharper increase in law students' prices faced and debt relative to undergraduate students. There were two blocks of control variables in this analysis: demographic measures from IPEDS (percent female and percent minority) and the institutional financial characteristics discussed above.
Limitations
The first limitation of this study is that it is possible that the additional availability of federal student loan dollars affected who ended up enrolling in law schools, as it is plausible that improved access to student loans would encourage more students to enter law school. To check this, I ran regression models using enrollment levels as the outcome of interest instead of pricing levels or student debt. The coefficients (available upon request) show no significant relationship between the implementation of the Grad PLUS program and enrollment levels at public colleges and a negative relationship at private nonprofit colleges. These results taken together suggest that additional students were not induced to enroll based on the availability of Grad PLUS loans.
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A concern regarding the difference-in-differences models is that undergraduate students were affected by some of the same student loan changes as graduate students (the expansion of income-driven repayment programs), while also being affected by different policy changes.
Undergraduate loan limits were increased twice following 2006, but by a much smaller amount that what graduate students saw in 2006 (Wei & Skomsvold, 2012) . Given some evidence that certain types of colleges responded to this increase in loan amounts by raising tuition (Lucca et al., 2015) , this likely understates the results when compared to a model examining just professional students.
One other limitation worth noting is that I am unable to separate the creation of the Grad [Insert Table 2 here] [Insert Table 3 here]
Turning to student loan debt of graduates as the outcome of interest (Table 4) , there was at best a modest relationship between the introduction of Grad PLUS loans and student debt. For public law schools, neither the change in level nor the change in slope was consistently statistically significant from zero in the models with control variables. Private law schools, on the other hand, saw a significant decline in debt post-2006 in the model running through the 2011-12 academic year (6.0 percentage points, p<.01) and an increase in the change in slope over time of 1.8 percentage points (p<.05). These differences generally did not exist over the longer panel, somewhat weakening the support found for the relationship between federal loan availability and student debt burdens.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Because it is possible that more selective and less selective law schools may be able to respond to increased federal student loan limits in different ways, I ran my primary model (with all control variables) by institutional selectivity for the full length of the panel. As Table 5 shows, the patterns of results were generally similar across the two selectivity groups. (The general trend also held over the shorter panel, with those results being omitted for the sake of brevity.) However, there were a few exceptions. Less selective public law schools had an immediate decline in the debt of graduates and less selective private law schools had an immediate increase in living allowances, while more selective schools did not see a significant
change. There was a negative trend in tuition and fees (the years*post-2006 variable) at less selective private nonprofit law schools, while there was an increase in the trend of debt burdens at the same institutions; this compares to insignificant coefficients for more selective nonprofit programs.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Difference-in-differences results
The second analytic strategy was to use difference-in-differences models to compare law schools and undergraduate institutions before and after the 2006 creation of Grad PLUS loans.
Turning first to tuition and fees (Table 6) , public law schools raised in-state tuition prices between two and three percentage points higher per year across the two different time periods than other colleges raised in-state prices for undergraduate students. Out-of-state tuition also increased at a higher rate for law students, with the annual increase being between one and two points larger than for undergraduate students. Part of this differential may be attributable to the Bennett Hypothesis, while another part could be due to limits that some states or university systems put on undergraduate tuition and/or fee increases (e.g., Armstrong, Carlson, & Laderman, 2017) . These findings are different than the interrupted time series results, which suggest a negative relationship between the creation of Grad PLUS and public law schools' tuition and fee prices.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Private law schools actually had their tuition increase by 0.3 percentage points less per year than the rate of change for undergraduate students over the full time period, yet the coefficient was insignificant when restricting analysis prior to the decline in law school enrollment. Overall, this suggests that Grad PLUS loans do not appear to be driving tuition increases at private law schools over time.
There is no evidence that public law schools increased their living allowances at a higher rate than undergraduate institutions following 2006 in the difference-in-differences models (Table 7) , matching the interrupted time series results from Table 3 . Among private institutions, there is some evidence in the shorter time period of analysis that law schools increased their living allowances faster than undergraduate institutions. However, this coefficient is modest (less than one percentage point per year) and does not hold for the full time period of analysis.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Finally, Table 8 contains the results of difference-in-differences results with student debt of graduates as the outcome of interest. Most of the models do show that student debt for law school graduates increased faster than for bachelor's degree recipients, which generally matches the point estimates (that were not always statistically significant) in the interrupted time series models. Notably, the estimated coefficients are somewhat larger over the shorter time period than the longer time period that includes a substantial decline in law school enrollments.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Discussion and Future Work
Ever since William Bennett hypothesized that increased federal student loan availability would result in higher tuition prices, the so-called Bennett Hypothesis has been hotly debated by researchers and policymakers alike. Yet most studies either focus on federal grant programs or try to isolate effects based on incremental increases to federal borrowing limits. In this study, I
provide the first quasi-experimental analysis of the creation of the federal Grad PLUS loan program in 2006-which represented an increase in federal loan eligibility of tens of thousands of dollars per year for many graduate and professional students.
My analyses suggest that the large increase in federal borrowing limits did not induce law schools to substantially increase tuition and fees (funds they do receive) or living allowances (funds they do not receive). However, the difference-in-differences models do suggest that any responses that do exist relative to undergraduate institutions may be concentrated among public law schools instead of private nonprofit programs. This runs counter to prior literature at the undergraduate level (Lau, 2014; Lucca et al., 2015) , but could be explained by the lack of tuition and fee controls in professional education that often exist for bachelor's degree programs at public colleges and universities.
I offer three potential factors that could explain the relatively modest relationship between law school prices and the availability and attractiveness of federal student loans for students. First, law schools as a whole did not appear to actively attempt to engage in additional rent-seeking behavior by increasing their prices in an effort to gain additional tuition revenue.
Some programs have responded to particular incentives under Public Service Loan Forgiveness to shift the incidence from students to taxpayers (such as the Georgetown Law example discussed earlier), but there appear to be few institutions that sharply increased tuition rates
above and beyond what they were doing prior to 2006.
The second potential explanation is that since law schools are an example of a higher education marketplace in which prospective students have reasonably good information about individual programs, a program that increases tuition more than its competitors may have seen a decline in enrollment-and potentially overall tuition revenue. If all law schools raised tuition by a similar amount, this concern could be lessened. Yet game theory suggests that programs have a strong incentive to deviate from the consensus in order to increase enrollment levels of pricesensitive students, and this could be particularly true in the post-Great Recession environment in which the number of prospective law students fell precipitously.
Finally, it is possible that the number of law students who faced credit constraints prior to the adoption of the Grad PLUS program could have been relatively low due to the presence of a robust private loan market during the 2000s. There is evidence that the adoption of Grad PLUS, combined with improved income-driven repayment terms, induced students to switch from private to federal loans during this period (Bhole, 2017) . It is likely that Grad PLUS loans extended access to capital to at least some students, but a sizable percentage of students could already access loans up to the full cost of attendance.
Grad PLUS loans and income-driven repayment plans have generated a great deal of discussions in policy circles in recent years due to their implications on the federal budget. Grad PLUS loans are currently counted as generating profits for the federal government, although the growth of income-driven repayment programs may change that assumption going forward (Congressional Budget Office, 2017; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2016). The results of this study suggest that policymakers may want to be less concerned about colleges using the availability of Grad PLUS loans as a way to fill institutional coffers, but more research needs to be done to confirm these findings in other professional programs. Notably, research should be done using programs in which fewer students would be interested in pursuing Public Service
Loan Forgiveness to see whether the presence of PSLF may have affected the relationships present among law students. In future work, I plan to extend my analyses to include MBA programs (which had the same pre-2006 federal loan limits as law schools) and medical schools (which had higher loan limits, but still often less than the cost of attendance).
Finally, more research should be done to explore whether the availability of Grad PLUS loans and income-driven repayment programs changed the types of students who enrolled in law schools or their post-graduation outcomes. If Grad PLUS loans reduced credit constraints for certain groups of students who may not have been able to get private loans, then the racial, gender, and/or socioeconomic makeups of law schools' applicant pools (and potentially their student bodies) may have also changed as a result. The availability of income-driven repayment programs for all federal loans could have also induced more students to pursue lower-paying work in public service fields, yet there has been no research to this point examining whether that has actually happened. (1) * represents p<.10, ** represents p<.05, and *** represents p<.01. (2) All financial variables have been logged and inflation-adjusted into 2016 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. (3) Regressions have a one-year lag between control variables and outcomes metrics and also include institutional fixed effects. (1) * represents p<.10, ** represents p<.05, and *** represents p<.01. (2) All financial variables have been logged and inflation-adjusted into 2016 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. (3) Regressions have a one-year lag between control variables and outcomes metrics and also include institutional fixed effects. (1) * represents p<.10, ** represents p<.05, and *** represents p<.01. (2) All financial variables have been logged and inflation-adjusted into 2016 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. (4) All models include all three sets of control variables (law school enrollment/demographics, law school admissions/selectivity, and institutional financial controls) and institutional fixed effects. Results with fewer sets of controls are available upon request. (1) * represents p<.10, ** represents p<.05, and *** represents p<.01. (2) All financial variables have been logged and inflation-adjusted into 2016 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. (3) Regressions have a one-year lag between control variables and outcomes metrics and also include year fixed effects. (1) * represents p<.10, ** represents p<.05, and *** represents p<.01. (2) All financial variables have been logged and inflation-adjusted into 2016 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. (3) Regressions have a one-year lag between control variables and outcomes metrics and also include year fixed effects. (1) * represents p<.10, ** represents p<.05, and *** represents p<.01. (1) * represents p<.10, ** represents p<.05, and *** represents p<.01. (4) All models include all three sets of control variables (law school enrollment/demographics, law school admissions/selectivity, and institutional financial controls) and institutional fixed effects. Results with fewer sets of controls are available upon request.
